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REPLY TO STUMP AND KRETZMANN 
Richard Swinburne 
Stump and Kretzmann object to my argument for substance dualism on the 
ground that its statement involves an implausibly stringent understanding 
of a hard fact about a time as one whose truth conditions lie solely at that 
time. I am however entitled to my own definitions, and there is a simple 
reason why the "standard examples" of hard facts which they provide do 
not satisfy my definition - they all concern instants and not periods of time. 
After alluding to various counter-arguments which they might produce 
against my modal argument for substance dualism; and generously con-
ceding various assumptions of mine which they would like to challenge, 
all given infinite time, Stump and Kretzmann home in on one counter-
argument which they regard as decisive. This depends crucially on their 
claim that (0' ii), "In 1985 Richard's soul begins to exist and exists for 
some time, however short", describes a hard fact about 1985. That, as 
they acknowledge, I deny, since it entails the non-existence of Richard's 
soul in 1984. I hold, in their words, that "any fact about a time t is a soft 
fact if it entails a hard fact about any other time, whether earlier or later 
than t." They then claim that this rules out many standard examples 
used to illustrate hard facts and consequently they find my "require-
ments for the status of hard fact" to be "very implausible". So they feel 
entitled to claim that (D'ii) describes a hard fact about 1985. 
In my original statement of the argument, I wrote only of proposi-
tions which "describe only 1984 states of affairs." I later put this in 
terms of the sharper notions of describing "hard facts" about 1984. 
Philosophical notions introduced into the literature by one author for 
one purpose often need tightening up when they are used by other 
authors or for other purposes, and become part of the general philo-
sophical currency. Since the argument being criticised is mine, I am 
entitled to my own way of tightening up terms, my own definitions. So 
even if certain "standard examples" of hard facts given by others don't 
count as hard facts on my definition, that is irrelevant to my argument 
which remains intact. 
Note however that my requirements for the status of hard fact are not 
nearly as "stringent" as Stump and Kretzmann imply. Pacts are not 
hard facts or soft facts simpliciter; they are hard facts or soft facts about a 
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time mentioned in the description of the fact. Now the facts which I dis-
cussed whose status as hard or soft was at stake were all facts about 
periods, i.e. intervals of some duration-1984 or 1985. And it is easy 
enough to give endless examples of hard facts about periods. Periods 
are bounded by durationless instants--1984 is bounded by midnight on 
31 December 1983 and midnight on 31 December 1984. I have argued 
(in a chapter from which Stump and Kretzmann cite another view of 
mine about time1) that all talk about events happening at instants is ana-
lyzable into talk about events happening over periods-e.g. an object 
being green at 2 pm, is it being green over a period which includes 2 pm. 
If that is correct, there will be no hard facts at all about instants. Of the 
three 'standard examples' which Stump and Kretzmann cite, one is 
explicitly about an instant and the other two contain dummy names 
which look as if they are names of instants. So it is not surprising that 
these are not hard facts-it is not an accidental or unwelcome conse-
quence of my definition. 
Oriel College-Oxford 
NOTES 
1. Richard Swinburne, The Christian God, Clarendon Press, 1994, pp72-4. 
